Beware Of Lanka’s Chi-Pak Axis

IN MAY 2006, TEHELKA carried my column arguing that a flawed understanding of newly-elected Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s politics had kept India from a crucial role there. Inactivity by India in the Sri Lankan crisis, I argued, would only hasten a process that could turn the island into a battleground of big power rivalries inimical to India’s long-standing interests – enforcing a Pax Indiana on the Indian Ocean.
After some 80,000 deaths over 25 years of conflict and the annihilation of the LTTE, there is an imminent danger that unless India engages constructively with post-war Sri Lankan polity, New Delhi could suffer severe setbacks in new domestic and geopolitical manoeuvres that threaten to alter the power dynamics in the region. China and Pakistan have taken advantage of India’s virtual non-involvement in the island during the last three years and have made impressive headway through arms shipments and economic and political ties.
Powerful elements of India’s security establishment fail to understand that despite Sri Lanka’s dependence on Pakistan and China for weapons during the last five years — there was no alternative for Lanka, in the face of India’s refusal to supply spares or offensive weapons — Rajapaksa was a bulwark against pro-Chinese and pro-Pakistani lobbies in his own country. It was a delicate balancing act. However, parliamentary and presidential elections early next year may radically alter all that, leaving India in a tough bind.
The character of Sri Lanka’s secular, non-aligned government — which has always been in India’s interests — is now under severe threat from a resurgence of right-wing supra-nationalist forces banding together under the banner of war hero Gen Sarath Fonseka, former army commander, who has decided to run for president against Rajapaksa.
Fonseka is a brave soldier who had his guts blown out by an LTTE suicide bomber in 2006. He is, however, a militarist, openly pro-China and provocatively anti-Indian, having recently described Indian politicians as “a bunch of jokers”. He is backed by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a pro- Maoist, pro-China, anti-Tamil group that has been virulently anti-Indian since the early 1970s, when its armed insurrection to overthrow the State was brutally crushed by Sri Lanka with the help of India. Later, the JVP entered mainstream politics and, during the last elections, secured 13 percent of the popular vote. It decided to support Rajapaksa because of his tough stand against the LTTE. Rajapaksa was a moderating influence on the JVP during the last four years.
Former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP has also jumped onto the Fonseka bandwagon, his only agenda being to recapture power at any cost. He is a weak, effete, fickle politician who, like his former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, played a double game of cozying up publicly with New Delhi through personal relationships with Indian leaders, while making defence and economic deals with China and inviting European countries to set up oil exploration ventures in ocean beds strategically close to India.
Fonseka’s differences with Rajapaksa are fundamental and have grave strategic portents for India and neighbouring countries. Last May, Indian pressure — just before the last stages of the general elections — mounted on Rajapaksa for a quick end to the war, in order to stave off a prolonged period of uncertainty about Tamil votes at home. Fonseka refused to listen to his President and insisted that the war should be one of prolonged attrition, no matter the cost, rather than a surgical attempt to retake Mullaithivu.
So deep were the differences that two weeks before the war was won, the General went on a long visit to China. The final operations were conducted under Rajapaksa’s brother Gotabhaya, the Secretary of Defence. This was also a way for Fonseka to absolve himself of any personal responsibility for collateral civilian damage during the final push.
The President and the General were also at loggerheads over the size of the army. Fonseca wanted to increase its postwar size to four lakh (more than twice its current size), while Rajapaksa wanted to demobilise and warned that an army that size (almost half the size of India’s) would be seen as a serious destabilising factor in the region and could pave the way for a massive militarisation of government and, perhaps, even a military ruler backed by the Chinese and Pakistanis.
In fact, Colombo got the jitters when, recently, to celebrate Army Day, Fonseka moved a huge armada of tanks to Bandaranaike Stadium. Rumour mill had it that the tanks would trundle into Temple Trees, the presidential palace to stage a military coup, but that, mercifully, did not happen.
Even sharper differences prevail between Rajapaksa and Fonseka over the return of 2.5 lakh Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their homes. Rajapaksa wanted the pace hastened and has been releasing them in batches. But just before Fonseka demitted office, he sent a huge contingent of some 20,000 IDPs back to the camps, following their release.
Adding to Fonseka’s ire and further fuelling his determination to challenge Rajapaksa are presidential inquiries into reports that link Fonseka’s son-in-law Danuna Tillekaratne to money laundering and shady arms deals –massive commissions from US-registered Hicorp International and British Borneo Defence for arms purchased as an exclusive agent; a deal done with the help of Colombo-based Pakistani arms dealer Ahmed Nissar. An official communiqué to the President specifically calls for the investigation of Fonseka’s role in helping his son-in-law.
In the last three years, China and Pakistan have taken advantage of India’s non-involvement in SL
During the last three years, Indian emissaries, including National Security Advisor MK Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and former foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee, have held innumerable private discussions with Rajapaksa in which they have expressed reservations about Colombo’s growing links with the China-Pak axis, repeatedly getting the commitment that he will never let his country be used by any power for hostile posturing against India.
He has spoken publicly in favour of India’s nuclear programme, acknowledged India’s supremacy in the Indian Ocean region and demonstrated his friendship with practical gestures. He made India the first country he visited following his election in 2005. He also showed regard for India’s sensibilities by cancelling orders for a Chinese 3-D radar ordered by the Chandrika-Wickremesinghe government, as well as giving India first priority in exploration rights in the Kankesanthurai (KKS) – rights that had been signed away to the Danish government by Chandrika and Wickremesinghe.
Whenever he is confronted by his having given the Chinese the Hambantota Port modernisation contract, or the agreement to develop an SEZ near Colombo, he argues that he has not given away any bases – these are commercial deals. He needs to hasten economic recovery and post-war reconstruction and the Chinese — unlike the Indians — give him favourable long-term concessional loans and execute turnkey projects that are also open to bidding by the Indians. And here’s the irony: the Indians accuse him of giving away too much to the Chinese, while his own countrymen and opponents accuse him of pandering to the Indians.
Fonseka is backed by a pro-Maoist, pro-China, anti-Tamil group that has been virulently anti-Indian
With Sri Lankan elections a few months away, Rajapaksa’s biggest challenge is to defeat the resurgence of right-wing forces in the country who threaten to change the entire power equation in the region. The President demonstrated political skills that enabled him to walk a political tightrope in getting Chinese and Pakistani support during the war, while still being able to curb their influence.
If the right-wing ultranationalists prevail in the upcoming elections, the first thing they will do is double the strength of the armed forces, which will not be a healthy development for India or the region. They will open up the country to Chinese and Pakistani influence. As they are opposed to devolution of power, they will also postpone Rajapaksa’s attempts at arriving at a far-reaching settlement with Sri Lankan Tamils, including implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which implements devolution.
Any postponement of a political settlement of the Tamil problem or delay in resettling IDPs will have consequences in Sri Lanka as well as India and could lead to further unrest. The danger signals are easier to read than tea leaves. How long will Pax Indiana’s opacity prevail?
WRITER’S EMAILibadhwar@gmail.com
From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 6, Issue 47, Dated November 28, 2009