Need for an autochthonous solution

Sri Lanka’s Foreign Secretary Dr. Palitha T.B. Kohona addressing the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Thailand on 1st September 2009, stated that Sri Lanka is one of those rare cases where terrorism has been comprehensively defeated, largely by its own efforts, despite all the advice, reservations and fears publicly expressed to the contrary.

Dr. Palitha KohonaThe Foreign Secretary also stated that despite misgivings locally and abroad, on the possibility of defeating the LTTE, “…the security forces of Sri Lanka, under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, decided to challenge the LTTE” which led to “…the much-feared LTTE” being “tattered and tottering remnant of its former self, having been methodically swept aside by the Sri Lankan security forces”.
Dr Palitha T.B. Kohona, Sri Lanka’s Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his address at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club in Thailand further said:
Sri Lanka is one of those rare cases where terrorism has been comprehensively defeated, largely by its own efforts, despite all the advice, reservations and fears publicly expressed to the contrary. A once-feared terrorist organization has been eliminated militarily. Only a shadow of that organization remains. Many, including senior officials in Sri Lanka, believed that the LTTE could not be defeated by the government security forces. In 2006, the Chief of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) a Swedish General Henrickson, who had commanded peace-keeping forces in the Balkans, advised Sri Lanka officials at the highest levels not to entertain any thoughts of confronting and defeating the LTTE militarily, as the terrorist group was far too good to be beaten.
Similar warnings were given by many heads of Western Missions based in Colombo who were very familiar with the LTTE, despite their own avowed anti-terrorist policies and military actions designed to counter terrorists far from their own borders. But the security forces of Sri Lanka, under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, decided to challenge the LTTE. The much-feared LTTE is now a tattered and tottering remnant of its former self, having been methodically swept aside by the Sri Lankan security forces.
The critical decision to take on the LTTE was made after much soul- searching, after the LTTE itself had scuttled three efforts in 2006 to end the conflict through negotiations. Since 1988, the LTTE had rebuffed repeated efforts by successive governments to reach a peaceful end to the conflict.
In February 2006, the LTTE left the negotiations convened in Geneva by the Norwegian facilitators with a commitment to reconvene in April. However an over-confident LTTE made outrageous demands on the government. They dictated how their Eastern leaders should be brought over to meet the Northern leadership for pre-negotiation consultations. Though the government made every effort with the assistance of the Peace Secretariat, to provide transport including by ferry, chartered helicopter and by seaplane, all efforts were rebuffed by an arrogant LTTE. In the meantime, the LTTE kept up a barrage of attacks on military and civilian targets, including a suicide bomb attack by a pregnant woman on the Army Commander, a claymore mine attack on a busload of civilians which killed 70 and a truck bomb targeting naval personnel on leave which killed over 120, all designed to break the will of the government or provoke a majority Sinhala backlash to gain international sympathy. Hundreds of soldiers and civilians were slaughtered in this murderous campaign of terror, but no civilian backlash occurred. However, it was becoming increasingly difficult for a democratically- elected representative government to continue to ignore such provocations without a response.
LTTE strategists realized that the civilian majority would not be provoked by these acts of terrorism. As the then Secretary-General of the Peace Secretariat, I led a Government delegation to the peace talks in Oslo in June 2006. The LTTE delegation led by its political chief Thamilselvam was flown to Oslo by the Norwegians. Though they had come to Oslo for talks, the LTTE just refused to sit down at the negotiating table, although the two delegations shared the same hotel. In July/August, the LTTE, in an unprecedented provocative move, cut off the water supply to 65,000 people in the Eastern Province by blocking a vital canal located in the North-Central Province which had never been part of the so-called Tamil homeland. After ten days of negotiations to get them to leave they were forcibly evicted by the Security Forces after a short, but bloody campaign.
Short of troops for this effort, the government had to surreptitiously move a battalion from the tense Jaffna front to the Mavil Aru canal area. This provocation was followed by massive attacks by the LTTE on the Security Forces, in Trincomalee, to the South of Trincomalee, and in the Jaffna peninsula and the forcible eviction of over 54,000 Muslims for Northeast Muttur. The famed Trincomalee Harbour was shelled from nearby Sampur. These attacks were repulsed convincingly and the LTTE was surprised by the resolve demonstrated by the security forces. This also boosted the morale of the troops. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the LTTE, believing its own propaganda and encouraged by the assessments of Western diplomatic missions, was determined to achieve its goals through violence and military means, rather than through negotiations.
The next round of talks convened in Geneva by the Norwegians was essentially scuttled by the LTTE walking out after making impossible demands, including the reopening A-9 road the main route to the north which was one of their main supply lines.
President Rajapaksa, who had even sent emissaries to the LTTE stronghold, Kilinochchi, to persuade them to return to the negotiating table, was now forced to make a critical decision to deploy his security forces against the LTTE.
Once the decision to engage the LTTE militarily was made, the Government took a firm policy decision to draw a distinction between the Tamil civilians and the terrorist LTTE.. This was an important strategic decision, as it helped to create the political space for the non-LTTE Tamils to support the Government, or at least stay neutral.
It also drew the attention of the international community to this important distinction made by the government between the LTTE and civilian non combatants. The government’s target was clearly not the Tamil community at large but the terrorists within that community. From the perspective of many Western democracies, this was important in view of the large Tamil populations which had settled in their countries after the riots of 1983 and which were becoming significant electorally. The import of this distinction became particularly vital in the light of the frenzied campaign carried out by the LTTE and its supporters over the years, and specifically, towards the end of the military campaign, alleging that the Tamil civilians were being indiscriminately targeted by the security forces.
Charges of indiscriminate shelling and genocide were used to rouse the Tamil diaspora abroad into frenzied demonstrations in the West, especially in the UK and Canada which in turn encouraged a sensation- seeking media to accuse Sri Lanka of violating international humanitarian laws.
There is hardly a war in which there were no civilian casualties. After all Sri Lanka did not coin the euphemistic phrase “collateral damage” several decades ago. It was certainly Sri Lanka’s policy to confront and defeat the LTTE not to harm the civilian population. The government’s policy was also designed to convince the Tamil civilians that it would provide them with better care and opportunities than the LTTE.
Despite the propaganda blitzkrieg of the LTTE and its supporters, enthusiastically lapped up by a media hungry for stories, the Western liberal establishment and its politicians who always had their eye on the Tamil vote- banks in their constituencies, the Government of Sri Lanka maintained its focus.
Allegations of genocide were refuted by pointing to the thousands of Tamil civilians who left LTTE-controlled areas over the years to live peacefully in areas under Government control. In fact 54% of Tamils live in Sinhala dominated areas in the South, outside the so-called homeland. It would be strange indeed, if the bulk of the Tamils fled their so-called homeland to live voluntarily in areas where genocide was apparently practiced. Charges of indiscriminate bombings of civilians, including medical facilities, sometimes backed by satellite images sourced to the United Nations, had to be refuted by challenging the veracity and the lack of corroborating evidence and the large scale movements of civilians to government controlled areas. Suggestions of large numbers of civilian deaths, made even by leaders of countries whose own forces were causing large-scale civilian deaths in anti-terrorist campaigns far from their own borders, also had to be refuted. The Government steadfastly maintained its own commitment to minimize civilian casualties among its own citizens.
In the early days of the campaign, the propaganda mouthpiece of the LTTE, the website Tamilnet, hardly said a word about civilian casualties because there were none to report. In fact the government policy of avoiding civilian casualties slowed down the military’s advance considerably. Each village and each town had to be approached with care to avoid civilian casualties – a policy that produced a dual impact.
The vast majority of the Tamils outside the areas of control of the LTTE could be convinced that the Government’s goal was not to harm the Tamils. Even Tamils living in LTTE controlled areas may have begun to believe that it was better to live under Government control. It should remembered that 60,000 to 70,000 Tamils had moved out of the Vanni to live in Sinhala majority areas in 2007/08, prior to the offensive in the North.
The policy of zero civilian casualties instilled a higher sense of caring discipline among the security forces compared with other forces battling rebel groups in the neighbourhood. There were very few complaints of indiscipline among the security forces.
As part of government policy, opportunities were created for non-LTTE Tamils to emerge from the shadows. Initially, they were slow to assert themselves, but once the fallacy of the LTTE’s invincibility was exposed, many took the risk of adopting a public stance against the LTTE. It was still a risk, as demonstrated by the brutal murder of a Tamil intellectual and peace activist Kethish Loganathan by the LTTE in 2006. Overseas, many Tamils who had marked time, now had the opportunity to go public with anti-LTTE views.
The Government, as part of a move to engage the Tamil diaspora in a dialogue, invited a representative group for discussions in early 2009. The President and senior Government Ministers took every opportunity to meet with members of Tamil groups on their visits overseas. This dialogue will continue. It was also abundantly clear that there was no unanimous affection for the LTTE or its self-centred leadership among many members of the Tamil community in the West.
It was also important to ensure that the international front was managed as carefully as the battle front in the Vanni. The LTTE and its propaganda machine kept up a barrage of anti government propaganda and the conflict was portrayed as one between an oppressor government and an oppressed minority. They cultivated community leaders, NGOs and decision-makers in the West for many years and many of them honestly believed the LTTE version of the conflict. It became necessary to counter this. Inevitably, it was difficult for the government to take the initiative as the LTTE was well-entrenched. The government's role was reduced to a reactive one. While the LTTE had hundreds of cadres working full time to advance its message, including by using the electronic medium-there were over 280 websites supporting the LTTE. Propaganda footage shot in Sri Lanka was usually released to media outlets within hours.
Many government missions overseas boasted only three or four staff who were also required to cover a range of issues. There were some who were not suited for the functions they were required to perform.
The Government's efforts overseas, especially its efforts to marshal the support of anti-LTTE elements in the Sri Lankan communities abroad, nevertheless, have borne significant results in recent years. Anti-LTTE civic organizations became activated as they began to see the resolve of the government in Colombo.
The LTTE remained proscribed in many of the Western democracies and in addition, LTTE front organizations have also been proscribed. Prosecutions have been launched against LTTE operatives fund raisers, arms procurers, organizers, etc in the USA, the UK, France, Canada, Italy and Australia. Covert intelligence sharing operations disrupted LTTE fund-raising, money laundering, arms smuggling and arms procurement activities. In a significant development, the government succeeded in capturing the LTTE’s key arms procurer Selvarasa Pathmanathan popularly known as “KP” just last month.
The government succeeded in maintaining pressure on the LTTE internationally and it was forced to operate generally as a clandestine organisation until recently when it decided to launch massive demonstrations abroad and brazenly display the LTTE flag even in countries that had proscribed the LTTE and had banned such acts of public display.
The consequent calls for a ceasefire and even action against Sri Lanka, including through the UN had to be countered, sometimes using direct contacts with foreign capitals. The Sri Lankan Foreign Service personnel performed creditably in all this. Following the defeat of the LTTE, efforts to bring Sri Lanka before the Security Council were countered and an anti-Sri Lanka resolution before the Human Rights Council in Geneva was roundly defeated with the help of friendly countries from round the world. The government maintained its focus in the face of all these external pressures.
All along, it was critically important to maintain India understands of Sri Lanka’s actions against the LTTE. The groundswell of sympathy that the LTTE had managed to develop in South India and the influence of South Indian politicians on New Delhi had to be taken into account. The LTTE, in an unbelievably shortsighted and petty act of vengeance had assassinated former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 using a woman suicide bomber, ensuring the enmity of India for a long time to come. Belated overtures at rapprochement were of little effect. The Sri Lanka government, under the leadership of President Rajapaksa, continued to reassure India that the conflict was with the terrorist LTTE and not with the Tamil population. Delegations at different levels were exchanged with India. India’s concerns were paramount as Sri Lanka sought to eliminate the terrorist menace. Even as the civilian population held hostage by the LTTE streamed into camps prepared by the government, India continued to be reassured that the civilians will be cared for and they were not the target, that internally displaced persons will be cared for and any grievances of the Tamil minority will be addressed through a political process. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution which resulted from the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987, would be the basis of Sri Lanka’s constitutional approach in addressing any grievances of the Tamil people.
The economy suffered immensely during 27 years of conflict. It is estimated that the country lost US$ 200 billion in opportunity cost. The importance of targeting Sri Lanka's economy was recognized early by LTTE strategists and every effort was made to cripple it. Their propaganda machine succeeded in convincing Western development partners to make human rights ( in other words, adopting a softer approach to the LTTE and a distraction from the main effort to crush terrorism) - a precondition for the granting of promised aid.
This soft approach to the LTTE by Western countries caused enormous resentment in the country. In due course, the USA made access to the Millennium Challenge Account conditional on compliance with standards which appeared to exceed even those that were applicable to themselves in their own “War on Terror”. The EC made the continued availability of the GSP + concession on which thousands of jobs depended, including those of women, subject to similar constraints. A cynic once observed that some Western nations have continued to labour under the “white man’s burden” in a different form. Nations that had undertaken military ventures far from their borders to counter terrorism and in the process caused untold harm to civilians, were now ironically standing in judgment over Sri Lanka.
Military sales to Sri Lanka were stopped and efforts were made to influence China to do the same. Instead of succumbing to these pressures, the government sought development assistance from other partners and non-traditional allies and turned to alternative markets, where possible. There was also recognition that economic power had shifted in the recent past to Asia and the East. This effort paid handsome dividends.
Iran, for example, pledged over $1.9 billion in development assistance to Sri Lanka. China's share of development assistance topped 1 billion US$. Japanese assistance continued unaffected by the critical approach of the Western democracies. India continued to assist Sri Lanka, including in strategic matters.
While Sri Lanka, confronted with the choice of economic blackmail or finding an accommodation with terrorism, had to strengthen its ties with alternative partners, it will work assiduously at fostering traditional ties. The government turned to new sources for military hardware. Helicopters, tanks, jet aircraft, artillery pieces, attack-craft etc., were sourced from non-Western countries.
The President, for his part, travelled regularly to key international destinations. He attended the UN General Assembly three times in successive years. He visited the UK, Libya, Iran, Jordan, China, Japan and most importantly India. This helped to manage those key international relationships and also to reassure those countries of the sincerity of our position at the highest level.
Given the Tamil Nadu factor, keeping New Delhi regularly briefed of our position and reassuring it of our intentions was important. Similarly, ensuring a regular flow of military requirements for the security forces was critical. My own visits to the Czech Republic and Israel in 2007 and Mexico in 2009 served this purpose. A constant effort was maintained to keep our friends briefed on the situation in Sri Lanka and holding back the anti-Sri Lanka tide that the LTTE and its sympathizers were generating. The government proactively reached out to the anti-LTTE Tamil groups and encouraged them to go public. Managing and encouraging the pro Sri Lankan diaspora was a critical part of our effort. Groups which had been functioning independently were brought together in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the USA, UK and Canada. In certain countries, the contribution made by the pro Sri Lankan diaspora was absolutely crucial in maintaining the pressure on their host governments. In some cases, this had been done sporadically by successive governments. Also important was the reaching out and the nurturing of the anti LTTE Tamil groups overseas.
The critical and central role of defeating the LTTE was played by thousands of young men and women who believed in the integrity of their country, who single-mindedly sought to ensure a land free of violence to future generations and who were driven by the single purpose of protecting what was theirs for the future.
Thousands laid down their lives. Many were left widowed or fatherless. We will never forget those who made the ultimate sacrifice for such a noble cause. The key difference in making these sacrifices was the leadership, the leadership that would not be swayed from its course despite the incessant mud-slinging from within, and the pressures from abroad. The President remained committed to eliminating the LTTE. The LTTE, even while gasping its last, succeeded in mobilizing its supporters abroad to exert enormous pressure on the Sri Lankan leadership. Fortunately, this leadership remained steadfast.
In addition, the men in uniform were now better trained, better armed and disciplined. Their level of commitment was high. The nation gave its troops the equipment they required and encouragement they deserved. They delivered the results.
For the first time in this conflict which had lasted over twenty five years the entire nation was mobilized. The nation which, by and large, in the past had been a bystander in the war effort, was made to feel a central part of it. For the first time, bill boards appeared calling on the country to back the security forces. With the mobilization of the entire population behind the war effort, recruitment ceased to be an issue. The national flag sold in much larger quantities than ever before.
An inspired leadership also subtly changed the rules of engagement of guerilla warfare. Instead of seeking to occupy or defend territory on a wide front, an approach which had been tried with poor results in the past, the military began to send highly trained and well equipped small units deep into LTTE controlled territory to harass LTTE units and disrupt their movements.
Very quickly the fabled guerillas of the LTTE were losing cadres in significant numbers and were reduced to manning protective bunkers and defending territory. Once this transition occurred, a well led, motivated, trained, and equipped conventional force was able to prevail. The rapid disintegration of the LTTE's fighting capabilities caught even the Sri Lankan military leadership by surprise.
The LTTE’s withdrawal from one population centre to another which began at a trot quickly became a dash from one safe haven to another, always herding large numbers of civilians and poorly trained child soldiers to provide a protective human shield. In the process, huge quantities of weapons, including long range artillery, heavy mortars, anti- aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, landmines, chemical weapon-making equipment, tanks, thousands of AK47s etc., purchased in the global black market with the voluntary or forced contributions of Tamils living overseas, and smuggled into the country were left behind. Large caches were buried and are being recovered on a daily basis. Efforts to build semi submersible sea going craft were quite evident from the fully and partly constructed vessels captured by the army. Large numbers of suicide vessels and attack craft were captured. Seven airfields (more than in the South) suggested goals which may have encompassed a much wider territorial ambition than Sri Lanka. The constant effort to build earthen embankments suggested a defensive mindset that had established itself in the LTTE. All this clearly indicates that a peaceful and negotiated end to the conflict was not the objective of the LTTE. Its solution was to impose a mono-ethnic, fascist state on the country. The much discussed grievances of the Tamils being at the core of the insurrection become highly debatable under the circumstances. It may have been the megalomania of an individual and the ambitions of a small group seeking to exploit the perceived grievances of the Tamil community to achieve a Hitlerite goal.
At sea, the navy began to challenge the capabilities of the LTTE resolutely. At one point, the SLMM suggested reserving a demarcated area in the sea for training by LTTE vessels and the SLMM chief had himself photographed on the deck of an LTTE attack craft. They had built significant numbers of vessels, some capable of developing over 45 knots and swarms of suicide craft. LTTE vessels had regularly engaged government naval craft usually swarming around them succeeding in inflicting significant losses. When not at sea, these vessels were dragged deep inland for safety or even taken to the opposite side of the Island for offensive operations there. With the development of a new strategy by the navy the LTTE rapidly lost its edge at sea. The Sri Lankan navy, with better intelligence and enhanced surveillance capabilities, went in search of LTTE seagoing ships carrying weapons, far from our shores and destroyed them. A fleet of locally built fast attack craft partly using technology copied from captured LTTE suicide boats, were deployed to swarm around and destroy LTTE vessels as soon as they were put out to sea. This forced the LTTE craft to stay inshore where they fell prey to the advancing army or were picked off by the air force. The crippling of the LTTE's sea capability also ensured that the quantity of weapons being smuggled was reduced to a minimum. The hopes of escape by sea for the LTTE leadership, was also eliminated.
With the nation solidly backing the military effort as witnessed by the government’s several electoral successes, the military eliminating the supposedly invincible LTTE fighting machine on land, in the sea, and in the air and the Government boldly confronting internationally, the LTTE, arguably the world’s most dreaded terrorist organization crumbled in the space of two and a half years.
There are many lessons for the world from this epic struggle. There are many lessons for Sri Lanka too. Our policy of clearly distinguishing the civilians from the terrorist LTTE was crucial. The zero civilian casualty policy was very important. We hope these lessons have been learnt. We can now set about the task of healing the wounds inflicted over 27 years and winning the peace. Winning the peace and ensuring dignity and hope for all our people, will be the next challenge.
It is by no means an easy task. We certainly do not think so. Sri Lanka realizes that having suffered 30 years of terrorism we need to move forward cautiously and with circumspection. We must move at our own pace, not the pace demanded by others who have not undergone the trauma suffered by our people but preach to us.
We need to find our own home- grown solution not succumbs to the dictates of others or their demands. Peace we will find, but in our own time.