by D.B.S. Jeyaraj
Throw a stone into placid waters and you get a big splash followed by numerous ripples. The ripple effect caused by the Fonseka factor continues to excite the contemporary Sri Lankan political scene.
The Presidential stakes earlier was a predictable one-horse race. With the anticipated entry of an old warhorse, an element of uncertainty has been introduced.
This sudden turn of events in the political scenario is certainly due to one man-Lt.Gen Gardihewa Sarath Chandralal Fonseka!
Sri Lanka’s outgoing Chief of Defense Staff General Sarath Fonseka smiles as he leaves his office during his farewell in Colombo on November 16, 2009-Getty images pic.
They say that old soldiers don’t die but simply fade away. But the refusal of one stubborn soldier to simply fade away and go out gently into that night has stirred the political cauldron.
In a swift counter-strike the former army commander and ex-chief of defence staff has enlivened and illuminated the drab,dreary, dull political environment. The Fonseka factor is the driving force now in current Sri Lankan politics.
But what you see is not what you may get! Ultimately!!
Movements are fluid in the fickle game of politics and present postures and positions may change drastically as elections are officially announced and combat begins in earnest.
Fluctuating changes may occur dramatically within current political configurations as the great game of elections begin.
At the time of writing this article on Thursday November 19th evening Mahinda Rajapaksa has completed four years of office as executive president.
He can therefore call for an early presidential election anytime before his term of office is scheduled to end in 2011.
The present Parliament was elected in April 2004. Therefore a new election must be held before April next year.
With the presidential term due to expire in 2011 and Parliament required to dissolve in 2010 simple logic deems that chances of elections to Parliament being held before Presidential polls are greater.
Nevertheless there is much speculation in the country as to whether The Parliamentary or presidential elections would be held first.
The underlying reason behind this speculation is that President Rajapakse would find it politically advantageous to go for an election before the end of his term although he would lose at least a year in office due to that.
Compensating for that loss would be anticipated political success of immense proportions.
Rajapaksa would get a massive victory in presidential elections due to the euphoric popularity gained by his impressive war victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE).
This in turn would help him further politically as more defections to the treasury benches from opposition ranks could occur. More importantly a Parliamentary poll in the wake of a Presidential victory would help the ruling party improve its standing substantially in Parliament.
On the other hand if Parliamentary elections were held first the government was expected to win but not overwhelmingly.
The United National Front comprising the United National Party (UNP),Sri Lanka Muslim Congress(SLMC)Democratic Workers Congress(DWC)Sri Lanka Freedom Party(Mhajana) and eight other smaller parties would perform satisfactorily.
There were also other parties like the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Tamil National Alliance(TNA) etc who could cut into votes since they had vote banks of their own.
Against that backdrop the opposition could win a fair share of the seats. It must be remembered that the current strength of the UNP and SLMC in Parliament is diminished due to large-scale defections to Govt ranks.
On another level the present parliamentary tally of parties like the JVP and its off-shoot the National Freedom Front(NFF) also don’t reflect their actual political strength in the country. The Jathika Hela Urumaya(JHU) and TNA parliamentary strength too may be reduced in fresh elections.
Under these circumstances the United Peoples Freedom Alliance(UPFA) was not expected to do very well if Parliamentary polls were held first. The UPFA would do creditably but chances of a two-thirds majority were remote. Some opine that even a simple majority may not have been gained.
Another problem was that candidates who strain every sinew to win seats in Parliament would not be as enthusiastic in working for Presidential victory after securing personal success.
There was also the possibility of disgruntled MP’s working with the enemy or crossing over prior to presidential polls after having made deals.
In such a situation Rajapaksa stood to gain more by having the presidential poll first.
He could galvanize the party into actively campaigning for him by offering to make them parliamentary candidates on the basis of their performance in helping to garner more votes for him at presidential polls.
Besides these calculations there was also the pathetic state of the opposition in disarray. There was no effective opposition candidate for the presidency. The UNP leader Ranil Wickremasinghe should be the best and only choice under normal circumstances.
But Wickremasinghe despite exemplary personal credentials has been unfortunately undermined as a weakling,loser and traitor through sustained false propaganda. Moreover significant sections of his party are disloyal to him and would definitely sabotage him in elections.
Though many other names like Karu Jayasuriya, SB Dissanayake, Sajith Premadasa etc have been bandied about as potential alternative candidates Ranil himself has not encouraged moves in this direction so far.
There is also the fact that none of these proposed alternatives have overwhelming support in the party. Also most UNP allies would not be happy with these people and would opt to work with Wickremasinghe rather than his would be successors.
As such the situation was one where Ranil Wickremasinghe would be Hobson’s choice due to the “TINA (There Is No Alternative)Factor” in politics. This suited Rajapaksa eminently as he was confident of battering Ranil in the political arena.
It was politically prudent therefore for President Rajapakse to cash in on his personal popularity and popularity accrued through war victory euphoria and derive maximum political gain by conducting and winning presidential elections with a vote landslide.
This being the grim reality there was little doubt that presidential elections would be held first and Mahinda Rajapaksa would win. The discussion was all about the election date and the extent of the winning margin.
That predictable atmosphere has dramatically transformed due to the Fonseka factor.
In a controversial turn of events the former Army commander on November 12th submitted his resignation from the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) post held by him. It was promptly accepted by President Rajapakse and came into effect from November 16th 2009.
Gen. Fonseka outlined certain grievances and reasons that led to his decision in his resignation letter with a three page confidential annexure comprising seventeen points.
The letter, annexure and their contents were leaked out to the media and provided much fuel for controversy.
It is widely believed that Sarath Fonseka would plunge into politics and would contest against President Mahinda Rajapakse if and when the presidential elections are held.
The erstwhile army commander’s foray into presidential hustings is expected to get the backing of a number of opposition parties ranging from the United National Party(UNP) to Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP).
In May this year when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) met its waterloo by the waters of Nandhikkadal lagoon, the lion’s share of credit for the victory against the tigers was apportioned to a triad at the helm.
The triumvirate comprising President Mahinda Rajapakse, Defence secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse and Army chief Sarath Fonseka was hailed for providing political, administrative and military leadership respectively in the triumphant war against the tigers.
Barely six months later this triumphant triumvirate lies fractured with Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka getting ready to cross swords with the other two in what is likely to be a bitter, divisive political battle to be fought fiercely.
It is as if Bernard Montgomery was contesting against Winston Churchill after World war two or Sam Manekshaw competing with Indira Gandhi after the Bangladesh war!
The current crisis is a result of brewing discontent between the Rajapakses and Fonseka over a long period of time. While these tensions were managed and contained during the war they have exploded openly after the war victory.
In a sense the strife is all about who deserves the greater credit and reward for fighting and winning the war. A fight for the spoils of victory!
Essentially this is a personality clash devoid of differences in principle or policy.Extreme paranoia, seething passions, jealousy, vengeful thinking and wounded pride have exacerbated the situation.
There is lamentable absence of firm policy and a complete abandonment of principle. A no holds barred political expediency seems to be the order of the day.
Attempts by one side to put down perceived political challenges and efforts by the other side to counter them are creating a situation where diametrically opposite forces are reconfiguring themselves as political bedfellows.
Several opposition parties have seized the opportunity and seek to exploit it cynically. Fonseka thinks he has the potential to win the presidency but lacks necessary political machinery and expertise for the task.
The opposition parties have the required political structures and wherewithal but do not have a “winnable” candidate capable of gaining success.
So there seems to be an unprincipled, opportunistic convergence of interests. An unholy alliance is seemingly in the making.
The opposition seems to have acquired a “champion” to fight Mahinda Rajapaksa .There is a naive belief that they, a bunch of civilian politicians can manipulate a war veteran of Sarath Fonseka’s calibre for their own ends.
It is like fighting fire with fire or cutting a diamond with a diamond.
The Rajapaksa regime has scored heavily against the opposition because of war victory euphoria. Mahinda Rajapaksa sought to utilise such “victory credit” in the Presidential hustings and acquire a virtual monopoly of the votes.
Now the opposition has hopes of backing another war hero against Rajapaksa. This hero is an actual general with direct military experience unlike Rajapaksa who only portrayed a “General” on screen in Gamini Fonseka’s “Nomiyenna minissu” (the immortals).
The ultra-nationalist, patriotic fervour whipped up by the Rajapaksa regime before, during and after the war has enveloped the majority community to a very great extent. Extolling Mahinda as “Maharajano” was one manifestation of this mood.
Now the opposition has a potential candidate who at face value seems capable of cutting into the Rajapaksa vote bank and perhaps edge him out in a neck to neck race.Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka are from the Southern province and appeal to the same constituency.
Thus the Fonseka phenomenon seems to have removed from Rajapaksa the rationale behind the intention to conduct Presidential elections before that of Parliament.
At least the opposition seems to think so and Ranil Wickremasinghe’s open challenge to the president daring him to hold the presidential poll first is an indicator of buoyant optimism in opposition folds.
Logically it seems absurd for Rajapaksa to go in for presidential elections and run the risk of being defeated or sqeaking through with a razor thin majority. Not only would he lose at least a year but also be rendered ineffective in ensuring a massive parliamentary victory.
Also by not conducting presidential elections his potential rival Sarath Fonseka would be placed in limbo.It seems highly unlikely that Fonseka setting his sights on the presidency would contest Parliamentary polls if they are held first. There is the question of which party symbol he would contest under.
At the same time the tenuous “unity” among opposition parties in supporting Sarath Fonseka as common presidential candidate could break if Parliament elections are held first. If parliamentary polls are held first the UNP-JVP “alignment” will be the first to dissolve.
Simple logic and common sense suggest therefore that Rajapaksa should stage the parliamentary elections first but then Mahinda the Machiavelli of Medamulana may have entirely different ideas.
Political calculations are not necessarily governed by rational thought at all times and there are many occasions where other seemingly “irrational” reasons also come into play.
In this instance there is also the “machismo” element. In a situation where Mahinda and Sarath hope to win enhanced support by projecting themselves as valiant war heroes both need to portray a “warrior” image to the masses.
Fonseka being an authentic soldier is at an advantage over Rajapaksa in this but the President must demonstrate his martial credentials to surmount the challenge. Therefore Mahinda cannot be seen as backing down in the face of a political challenge being thrown at him by Fonseka.
Although Fonseka is yet to officially announce his presidential ambition and is most probably waiting until elections are declared to throw his hat into the ring the ex-army commander has already flung the gauntlet down at his erstwhile commander-in-chief privately.
Mahinda Rajapaksa and Sarath Fonseka had a one to one conversation on November 11th at “Temple Trees” after the National security council meeting. Fonseka in that encounter informed Rajapaksa candidly that he intended retiring from the army and contesting the presidency.
According to media reports the President had received this “news” with equanimity and said he was prepared to accept Fonseka’s resignation whenever he submitted it. In customary fashion Mahinda reportedly told Sarath smilingly that he (Fonseka) would lose the presidential elections and was most welcome to return to him after being defeated.
In that context Rajapaksa would lose face if he avoids a frontal challenge by having the presidential election after parliamentary polls. He has to take the bull by its horns instead of seeking refuge behind a parliamentary election. It is a metter of honour!
There is a strong “machismo” element in this with a mixture of emotions like pride, shame, courage and cowardice.Sometimes such emotional thinking leads to defeat.
History tells us that the old king Elara accepted a challenge for single combat by the younger Dutu Gemunu and lost though Elara’s army was superior on the battlefield and had the advantage.
It is said that Theodore Roosevelt contested the American presidency as a third “independent” candidate with his “BullMoose” party against Taft and Wilson because someone had posed the public query “Is the hero of San Juan Hill a coward”?. Earlier Teddy Roosevelt had been wavering about deciding.
Likewise Mahinda too has to accept and confront this challenge. Since he is not a professional soldier the onus is on him to demonstrate that he too is a warrior and not a coward who would avoid or postpone a direct fight. In the jargon of a street-fighter Mahinda must prove that he is “Ona ekata ottu” (ready for anything).
Furthermore accepting and facing a challenge heads on is a character trait too.There are several who underestimated Mahinda and have referred to him derisively as a coward in politics. Even now we read interviews given by his political opponents describing him as a coward.
The irony is that the people who call him coward are still in the opposition tasting defeat after defeat while the so-called “coward” parades as conqueror.
The litmus test of Rajapaksa’s political courage was in the manner in which he withstood immense international pressure to declare a ceasefire at a time when the armed forces were poised to defeat and destroy the Tigers.
Given the qualitative and quantitative nature of that pressure a lesser man may have wilted. But Mahinda stood steadfast defying the global powers that be in a critical phase of history.
Like Prometheus there is a price to pay for defying the Gods. This is the downside of that defiance that could adversely affect the country but the point here is that Rajapaksa did not back down even when pressured by global powers.
To some extent Mahinda’s mindset may be shaped by his particular environment. The propensity for violence in the Weeraketiya and Walasmulla areas illustrate the combative sub- culture of the place. It is this perhaps which prompted the laird of Girawapattu to warn Velupillai Prabhakaran earlier that he was “Mahinda from Medamulana” and not to “push him against the wall”.
Now “Medamulana Mahinda” is being driven against a different wall by his political detractors. Current reality is that these parties either singly or jointly cannot match “war victor” Rajapaksa but with “war hero” Fonseka hope to pose an effective political challenge to Mahinda.
The need to face a direct presidential challenge first could be a shrewd political move too. Having a parliamentary election first is logically sound and could divide the opposition and drive Fonseka up a gum tree but there could be negative connotations too.
Politics is very often a question of perception. Image versus reality!
For instance Ranil Wickremasinghe is certainly no traitor and a loser but constant propaganda has succeeded in instilling such a negative image of him in the minds of many.
Likewise Mahinda avoiding a presidential election could create a negative image of him being seen as a coward and weakling. The opposition would go to town saying Rajapaksa could not face Fonseka in a direct presidential tussle and that was why he had parliamentary polls first.
The reality that the Parliament elections cannot be delayed beyond April 2010 while presidential polls need not be held till Nov 2011 will be lost on many . Perception can be damning. Wrong signals could be conveyed to the electorate.
So voters perceiving wrongly that Rajapaksa cannot face Fonseka may vote for opposition parties in a Parliamentary poll too.
Whereas if Rajapaksa advances the date of presidential elections, confronts the Fonseka challenge directly and overcomes it successfully that victory could translate into an avalanche of votes at Parliamentary hustings too.
This perhaps explains the alacrity with which the president accepted his chief of defence staff’s resignation and relieved him of his duties without too much delay. It was as if Mahinda was telling Sarath “get ready for the fight as soon as possible”.
There was a powerful school of thought which advocated a proposal that President Rajapaksa should “delay” his acceptance of Fonseka’s resignation. According to letter of the law his resignation would be deemed valid only if the president formally accepted it.
At the same time a serving army officer could not contest elections or engage in politics while wearing the uniform. But Fonseka would be considered to be in service as long as his resignation was not accepted.
So all that President Rajapaksa had to do was to delay formal acceptance of Fonseka’s resignation and keep him in a “trisangu” state (Between two worlds) Meanwhile nominations could be called for presidential elections and Fonseka would be forbidden by law to contest.
It would be a catch-22 situation then.
If Fonseka obeyed the law and refrained from contesting the opposition would be deprived of a candidate who could pose a real challenge to Rajapaksa.
If Fonsela defied regulations and tried to contest he was liable to be penalised and prevented from contesting legally. Even if Fonseka mounted a legal challenge against what was clearly a violation of the “democratic spirit” the courts would most probably abide by the law despite the unfair result.
Those who wanted Rajapaksa to adopt this course of action felt it was a winning strategy all the way.
But they failed to take into account both the combative personality of Mahinda in taking up challenges as well as his political acumen in realising that any sign of perceived weakness or cowardice would be detrimental in the long run.
This perhaps explains the cool demeanour with which he has been treating the Fonseka phenomenon.
Instead of stonewalling as he could have done President Rajapaksa accepted the resignation instantly and has cleared the decks for swift transition by Fonseka from soldier to politician.
By displaying an air of nonchalance in facing up to the Fonseka challenge, Rajapaksa is showing the electorate that he is “Kaatawath mang Baya nehe” (I am not afraid of anyone)in a political sense.
Media organs supportive of the opposition and Sarath Fonseka dish out news items saying how afraid and panicky Rajapaksa is. But contrary to such propaganda, events on ground indicate that Mahinda Rajapaksa is gearing up to hold Presidential elections and fight against Sarath Fonseka.
Ideally this is a contest that should not have happened. A scenario where an ex-army commander contests the presidency against the incumbent president could trigger off a set of unexpected developments and unintended consequences.
Chief among these is the distinct probability of politics pervading the armed forces and causing irredeemable harm for the Country.
It is in the interests of not only President Rajapaksa but the nation at large for saner counsel prevailing even at the eleventh hour and resolving differences with Sarath Fonseka.
Perhaps the wounded pride of the Ambalangoda lion could be healed by transforming the retired Lt. General into Sri Lanka’s first Field Marshall.
Perhaps the opposition parties would realise their irresponsible folly and desist from pushing/pulling Fonseka into hurly-burly politics.
But if this highly desirable situation does not materialise then a titanic clash between commander in chief and ex-commander would be inevitable.
In such a scenario Mahinda Rajapaksa would have no choice other than to face the challenge posed by Sarath Fonseka at the presidential hustings as early as possible.
While having presidential elections is now a matter of honour the Medamulana Machiavelli has other related options too.
One is to have both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections simultaneously and confound the opposition.
Another is to dissolve Parliament and announce elections even as the presidential poll campaign is on.
We are in for interesting times.
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