Sri Lanka: Radical diaspora could back new violence

Source: Oxford Analytica
Date: 20 Jul 2009
SUBJECT: Radicalisation in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.
SIGNIFICANCE: Members of the million-strong Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora organised large-scale meetings in early 2009 in which support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was openly, and illegally, expressed. Funding, arms procurement and advocacy by Tamils in North America, Europe and Australasia played an important role in the island's ethnic conflict; any resurgence of separatist violence would likely be led from those areas -- to the consternation of host governments.
ANALYSIS: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were founded in 1976 in response to discrimination in post-independence Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon). From that date until their May 2009 defeat by the Sri Lanka Army, the LTTE committed human rights violations that included:
- the frequent use of child soldiers;
- the recruitment and training of suicide bombers, notably women;
- the use of civilians as human shields; and
- the expulsion, in the early 1990s, of some 1,000 Muslims from LTTE-occupied territory.
LTTE fundraising. The rights abuses are not limited to Sri Lanka. The LTTE had for many years pressured members of the Tamil community abroad to provide financial support for their operations. In late 2005 and early 2006, as violence escalated in Sri Lanka's north and east, a massive fundraising drive was launched in Canada (at 300,000 people, home to the largest Tamil diaspora) and parts of Europe:
In Canada, families were typically pressed for between 2,500-5,000 Canadian dollars (2,147-4,300 dollars), while some businesses were asked for up to 100,000 Canadian dollars.
Although many members were apparently willing contribute, coercion was evident. Tamils in the United Kingdom, for instance, claimed that they were being intimidated into handing over 'donations' of up to 50,000 pounds (79,000 dollars). When they failed to do so, the LTTE threatened their families in Sri Lanka.
In response to these actions, some 32 countries, including the United States, Canada and the countries of the European Union declared the LTTE a terrorist organisation.
Extent of support. The LTTE's support is difficult to measure precisely. However, a series of major demonstrations in early 2009 against the Sri Lankan military's actions saw substantial, sometimes majority backing for them. LTTE flags were common, condemnations of LTTE abuses rare if not non-existent:
The first protests occurred in Chennai and other cities of Tamil Nadu, India in mid-2008 where organisations, politicians, celebrities and student associations urged the government in Delhi to take action. Others followed in London, Toronto, Ottawa, Paris, Washington, New York, Berlin, Geneva, Zurich, Oslo, Sydney, The Hague, Canberra, Auckland, Wellington, Copenhagen and Kuala Lumpur.
The goals of the protests were to force political intervention to establish a ceasefire in the Sri Lankan Civil War, appeal to humanitarian organisations to provide resources to the affected areas and remove the LTTE from any list of terrorist organisations. After the civil war was ended on May 18, protests continued in a few countries, urging governments to undertake a war-crimes inspection (see SRI LANKA: Violence may complicate northern elections - June 11, 2009 and see SRI LANKA: Rajapakse's allies may resist devolution - May 22, 2009).
Protesters' demographics. In Canada and the United Kingdom, the driving force behind the protests was young, second-generation Tamils. A key UK figure was Thusiyan Nandakumar, of Students Against Genocide of Tamils. He went on record saying that people who were "anti-LTTE in the past" were now talking of "taking up guns" for the LTTE's "necessary" struggle. Precise figures are unavailable, but large numbers (perhaps the majority) of young Tamils abroad have become committed to backing the vision of an independent Tamil homeland and strongly opposing the Sri Lankan government.
Reasons for radicalisation. The Tamils' radicalisation reflects five related, and self-reinforcing, factors:
Colonial history. During the imperial era, the British maintained power through strategies of indirect rule. In Ceylon, members of the Tamil minority occupied positions of privilege, breeding resentment among the Sinhalese majority.
Independence legacy. After independence, the Sinhalese majority sought to redistribute jobs, power and prestige -- leading quickly to discrimination. Precisely the same dynamic, though arguably yet more discriminatory, was seen in East Africa's Africanisation programmes.
The Sri Lankan government:
- made Buddhism the official religion and Sinhalese the official language;
- placed restrictions on Tamil admittance to university; and
- pursued unfavourable citizenship policies towards the 'up-country' or 'Indian' Tamils -- the descendents of those brought by the British to work on the tea plantations of south-central Sri Lanka.
These actions were often a matter of one ethnic group exacting revenge for real or perceived wrongs during the colonial period, and using majoritarian democracy to do it. They were implemented in an atmosphere thick with Sinhalese nationalist ideology, of which Buddhist monks were among the most avid supporters. Grievances were deepened by episodes of communal violence in which the government and police stood aside.
Genocide myth. Discrimination against Tamils was real, but it has been exaggerated by the successful exploitation of this history of by the LTTE and their supporters abroad. Disenfranchisement and economic discrimination may be human rights violations, but they are a far cry from genocide.
Yet, the LTTE and their supporters have repeatedly argued that the Sri Lankan government is conducting a genocide of the Tamil people. This myth is widely believed by Tamils abroad, and has also been accepted by some portion of the broader public. As seen in the cases of Palestinians and Kurds, convincing a people that their co-nationals are being deliberately and systematically exterminated is a fertile base for radicalisation, above all among the young.
Diaspora lenses. The success of this effort has meant that the LTTE, despite its murderous brutality, has convinced the Tami diaspora and many others that it is the victim: an underdog carrying out a brave struggle against the all-powerful Sri Lankan military state. Such a romantic recasting of political realities has long had powerful and radicalising appeal -- as witnessed in the case of Germany's Baader Meinhof Group, the United Kingdom's IRA, and Spain's ETA. The LTTE benefited immensely from a broader feature of all diasporas: being far from the conflict, they are more susceptible to a simplified and purified distillation of ideology. (A close analogy is with the IRA's sympathisers in North America).
Silenced alternatives. Within Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers succeeded in making themselves the only voice of the Tamils. As the efforts of moderate Tamils to reach an agreement failed -- partly through the fault of the Sri Lankan government -- they were pushed out, and in many cases murdered, by hardliners. Although they murdered more Tamils than did the Sinhalese, the LTTE and its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran succeeded in presenting themselves as the only voice of the Tamil people.
CONCLUSION: Radicalisation is real and extensive in the Tamil diaspora, particularly its youth. If President Mahinda Rajapakse introduces constitutional reform and wins over moderate Tamils at home, this will likely subside over time. If his government succumbs to nationalist pressures and alienates Tamils further, the diaspora might once again become the locus of funding and organisation for further spasms of LTTE violence. Republished on ReliefWeb with the permission of research and consulting firm Oxford Analytica Ltd. Copyright 2007 Oxford Analytica Ltd. All rights reserved. For additional information, please visit Oxford Analytica or write to enoel@oxford-analytica.com